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Changes in the food industry will
be slow coming due to potential lack
of availability of capital.
It’s a real pleasure to be with
you today to discuss the economics of
various forms of food retailing in the
United States, both today and in 1985.
When Lew Norwood assigned this topic to
me, I knew it would be difficult to
assess the current economic problems
facing food retailers, much less grapple
with 1985. If most of you are like my-
self, you have difficulty looking for-
ward to tomorrow or next week, much
less ten years from now. However, in
order to start I thought it would be
best if we looked at today’s economics
of the various forms of food retailing
as shown in Table 1.
In Table 1, I have listed the four
types of food retailers that we are
considering-- the convenience store, the
limited assortment store, supermarkets,
and the super store. The number of
check stands ranges from one to two in
a convenience store, up to fifteen to
twenty in a super store, although many
super stores are substantially bigger.
The number of employees likewise range
substantially from two to four in a
convenience store up to in excess of
250 in a super store. Weekly sales
range from $5,000 to in excess of
$300,000 for the super store.
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Gross margin, or the initial
gross profit that is made on the
merchandise that was purchased, ranges
from a high of 30% for convenience
stores, to a low of 15% for limited
assortment stores. The supermarkets
and the super stores both have a gross
of about 20%. This gross is based on
the total sales mix and for supermar-
kets and super stores includes gen-
eral merchandise, meat and produce, as
well as grocery items.
The number of items ranges from
1,000 in a limited assortment store,
although some limited assortment
stores go down as low as 600 or 700
items, up to 12,000 items plus for the
super stores.
I think that the key factor is
the gross margin, because this in-
dicates the amount of cost of distri-
bution and profit which the consumer
will allow the distributor to have
over and above the wholesale cost of
the merchandise. The limited assort-
ment store shows a 15% gross on a
relatively small number of items. The
economics of this type of store are
based on the fast-moving items, or
most commonly purchased items. These
items are pulled from the supermarket
form of’retailing and put into a
limited assortment store with a low
gross margin. These limited assortment
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Limited
Convenience Assortment Supermarkets Super Store
Checkstands 1-2 1-3 9 15-20
Employees 2-4 4 40 100-250
Weekly Sales $5,000 $20,000 $80,000 $125,000-
300,000
Gross Margin 3o% 15% 2o% 2o%
Items 3,000 1,000 6,000 12,000
stores could be placed in recycled
supermarkets that have gone out of
business or in other second-use retail
establishments.
The economics of the limited
assortment store are that with a high
volume the store can operate on a low
overall gross margin. I think the
fallacy in this thinking is that even
though the limited assortment store’s
overall gross would be less than a
supermarket, the retail prices on these
fast-moving items may not be much dif-
ferent than the retail prices in a
supermarket. Although a supermarket
averages 207.gross, once the meat and
produce--generalmerchandise--is taken
out, the gross for the grocery depart-
ment is probably 17%. Now that 17% is
an average of all the items in the
department. The 20% of the items which
are very fast moving which would be
candidates for the limited assortment
store, typically have a lower gross
margin and are probably only carrying
a 13% to 15% gross margin in the super-
market. The remaining 80% of the
grocery items in the supermarket which
move slower typically have higher gross
margins so that the overall gross
average is 17% or 18%. So therefore,
the items which would be stocked in
the limited assortment store may end
up having retail prices very comparable
to that now in the supermarkets and
for that reason may not offer the con-
sumer any bargain. The consumer
would be forced to make a second stop
shopping and this inconveniencemay
be the downfall of limited assortment
stores.
At the present time there are
only a handful of these limited assort-
ment stores in the United States, and
it is too early to see what their
results will be. Due to the lack of
experience with these stores in the
United States, I do not have adequate
figures to present concerning their
actual results.
In order to look at the economic
feasibility of these different forms
of food retailing, we must ask our-
selves these four questions. Number
one, “How much will it cost?” Number
two, “How can it be paid for?” Number
three, “How much volume is needed to
break even or to produce a profit?”
and number four, “Was it really worth
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is the return on investment adequate?
Or is the capital required more efficient
if it is used for other purposes?
Let’s look at the first question,
“How much will it cost?” Figure 1
shows the total required investment for
these various forms of food stores.
The figures for the convenience store
come from the National Association of
Convenience Stores 1975 State of the
Industry Report, while the figures for
the supermarket and super store are
taken from reports from Super Market
Institute. The figures for limited
assortment stores are based on some
articles which have been prepared
describing this form of store. Note
that it takes approximately $95,000 to
invest in a new convenience store com-
pared to $1,150,000 for a super store.
The average super store for purposes
of this report is 37,000 square feet
based on a study by Super Market Insti-
tute, although many super stores are
substantially bigger.
It is interesting to note that the
2,400 square foot convenience store,
which costs $95,000, is comparable on a
square foot basis to a 25,000 square
foot supermarket which costs $920,000,
There is approximately a ten to one
ratio in both the square footage and the
total dollar cost. The corporate al-
location of $100,000, which I have in-
cluded for supermarkets and super stores,
represents a prorata share of the store’s
supporting facilities for warehousing
and delivery which is common in most
supermarket chains.
As you can see from these figures,
it is a very expensive proposition to
put up a new store. The land and build-
ing is typically leased, the equipment
is purchased on credit, and the working
capital must be provided by equity money
or extended terms from suppliers.
Table 2 shows an analysis of
these figures for convenience stores
and supermarkets on a square foot basis.






















I did not have adequate figures for the
limited assortment stores and super
stores to make this comparison for them.
Note that the total investment per
square foot is $40 for the convenience
store compared to $37 for a supermarket.
This is not just the investment in land
and building, but this also includes the
equipment and working capital. The
owner’s equity for a convenience store
is only $9 per square foot compared to
$13 for the supermarket. What this
means is that for a $40 total cost per
square foot of store in a convenience
store, $31 is provided by outside
capital or borrowed funds and only $9
is prwided by the owners of the store.
This is greater than a four to one ratio
of total investment to equity. In the
supermarket situation $13 of equity is
required per square foot, so for a $37
total investment per square foot, the
owners must come up with $13 of their
own money in a supermarket situation.














































































































































50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
00 0 0 0
TN
0 0 0 0 0 0




February 76/page 90 Journal of Food Distribution Resear{The amount of owner’s equity is a
key factor in evaluation of the over-
all return on investment of each form
of retailing. Because the more capital
that’s necessary per square foot, the
higher profit is necessary in order to
achieve the same return on investment.
The reason that the owner’s equity is
less in a convenience store situation
is that a larger proportion of the total
assets is in the form of land and build-
ing, which are typically leased or
financed 100%. The sales per square
foot on an annual basis range from $105
for a convenience store to $160 for a
supermarket t. From a space productivity
standpoint, the supermarket is obviously
much more productive and has much more
merchandise moving in and out on a
square footage basis.
The next item is gross margin per
square foot. And remember, we are not
talking about gross margin as a percent
of sales, but gross margin dollars
contributed per square foot of space.
The gross margin per square foot in a
convenience store situation exceeds the
gross margin dollars per square foot in
a supermarket, or $31 compared to $29.
Even though the convenience store has
substantially less sales per square
foot, with the higher gross margin
percent, the overall dollars return per
square foot actually exceeds that of the
supermarket. The cost of running the
store on a square foot basis must then
be deducted from the gross margin to
arrive at the income before income
taxes. The total expenses are slightly
higher in the convenience store situa-
tion or $27 compared to $26 for the
supermarket. The resulting figure or
profit per square foot is about $4 for
the convenience store compared to $3
for the supermarket.
with the total investment of $40,we
would have a 10% return on total
investment. However, we must pay in-
come taxes on that profit, which
reduces our overall return on total
investment to 6.3% for the convenience
store. This compares to 5.5% for the
supermarket or approximately the same
return on total investment. However,
remember we have much more leverage
in the convenience store and only have
$9 of owner’s capital invested per
square foot compared to $13 for the
supermarket. It’s for this reason
that our return on owner’s investment
is substantially higher in a convenience
store than in a supermarket--27.7%R.O.I.
for convenience stores versus 13.977
for the supermarket.
From this analysis it is clear to
see that the overall R.O.I. depends on
many factors, including the amount of
investment, the method of financing,
the total sales, the gross margin, and
the operating expenses. One key factor
which is often overlooked is the
financing method which determines how
much owner’s capital is employed in
the business versus other people’s
capital. It is the wide use of leverage
or other people’s capital which can
result in a significant increase in
the profitability of the owner’s capital.
It’s not only necessary to manage the
assets properly, but it is also necessary
to manage the debt properly.
I think another key point illus-
trated by this example is that we
should look at our operations in various
ways and one helpful way is on a per
square foot basis. I think retailers
get too much involved in using per-
centages and percent of sales figures
where actual dollars are the key mea-
sures of success and productivity.
If we compare the $4 of profit per
square foot in the convenience store
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convenience stores and supermarkets
after correcting for inflation have
actually been going down over the past
few years or at best, have not increased.
This means that the industry has been
adding square footage at a faster rate
than they have been adding real sales.
Obviously, an economic correction was
necessary and is now taking place in
the form of substantial numbers of
closed stores. A&P, for example, closed
1,200 stores and many other chains are
suffering from over-stores situations in
their competitive areas.
With the high cost of construction,
I think that retailers should consider
recycling these stores into more profit-
able operations rather than adding on to
the existing square footage. Many of
the independentshave been able to do
this very successfully and have taken
stores that have been losing money in a
chain operation and turned these stores
around into very profitable stores.
Table 3 shows the total investment
required for a typical supermarket of
25,000 square feet. Note that equity
accounts for $300,000 of the investment,
while the land and building at $500,000
are leased and a portion of the equip-
ment is covered by borrowing strictly in
the form of bank loans. During the last
couple of years it has not been possible
for the food distribution industry to
obtain equity financing due to the stock
market situation and the low earnings in
the industry. Therefore, the main
source of credit has been from bank
financing or term notes. But neverthe-
less, it still takes a substantial amount
of equity to put up a supermarket. For
that reason there is a substantial risk
in each decision to build a new super-
market. The convenience store has a
distinct advantage here in that the
total equity required for a convenience
store may be as low as $10,000 to












$20,000 and in the event that the store
does not work out, it is much easier
to find a new tenant for that store
than it would be for a large super-
market.
When we talk about profits of the
industry being at a low level, we are
looking at overall industry averages
and this obscures a possible problem
with new stores (Table 4). A new store
must be much more productive than the
average store in order to justify the
Table 4. Profits on New Supermarkets









(Assumes same sales, gross, expenses,
etc.) If all stores were new super-
markets, profits and R.O.I.would be cut
50-60% as well as a reduced cash flow
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and higher land costs, the rent on a
new store may be 1.7% of sales versus
an average of 1.4% of existing stores.
In other words, the new store would have
to generate .3% more profit in order to
pay the rent. Equipment costs have
gone up, which would increase the equip-
ment costs from .7% to .970 of sales.
With higher interest rates and higher
borrowing required for new stores, the
total increase cost would increase from
l 2% to .3%. Now if we assume that an
existing store and a new store have the
same sales, gross margin percent, pay-
roll and other expenses, we would have
to have .6% more earnings from the new
store in order to match the profits of
existing stores. Or looking at it
another way, a new store may earn less
than our existing stores. The break-
even point on a typical new supermarket
probably is in excess of $3 million of
sales per year, which in itself indicates
a substantial risk in making such a
high investment.
Finally we ask ourselves, “WaS it
worth it?” We must be careful that we
do not build new stores just for the
sake of growth. If we cannot have growth
without adequate profits, we will
actually be creating inefficiencies in
the system and have a wasted use of
capital. With capital being much more
scarce today and in the future than it
has been, the industry must be very
careful in the use of the capital dol-
lars which are available for new store
construction. Each owner must evaluate
how much risk he is willing to take and
how much he is comfortable with.
Finally, in looking at the future
it is very helpful to look at the past.
While the past is not a true road map
as to what will happen in the future,
it does give us some perspective. In
Table 5 I have shown the key operating
ratios as presented by Super Market
Institute in their operations review
for the second quarter of 1975, com-
pared with the second quarter of 1965.
What will happen in 1985 is purely
conjecture at this point.
It is interesting to note that
the gross margins have stayed approx-
imately the same over this ten-year
period. Although inflation rates in
food prices have risen substantially,
the gross margin as a percent of sales
has remained constant at 18.1 to 18.3%.
Store labor expense has increased from
8.2% to 9.4% of sales. This means
that wage rates have actually increased
faster than the inflation in our sales.
Undoubtedly, this is the result of
higher minimum wage laws and the im-
provement of labor rates throughout
industry in general. The average wage
rate increased from $2.14 to $4.23. I
would expect in the future that this
trend would continue and that store
labor expense will be an increasingly
larger portion of the sales dollar.
Rent and real estate costs as a
percent of sales have actually de-
creased slightly during this period,
while construction costs have increased
substantially. I think a key factor
here is that there is a time lag in
the current construction costs being
reflected in the overall average
rental cost. The rent expense includes
both old and new stores and it will
take a few years for higher construc-
tion costs to reflect themselves in
higher overall rents for the industry.
Utilities have increased sub-
stantially, as we would expect. They
have increased from .7% in 1965 to
.9% of sales. This will probably
continue until some solution is found
to the energy problem. Depreciation
expense is approximately the same and
even slightly less now than it was in
1965.
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% of Sales
Supermarkets 1965 1975 1985
Operations
Gross Margins-Maintained 18.1% 18.3% ?
Store Labor Expense 8.2% 9.4% ?
Average Wage Rates $ 2.14 $ 4.23 ?
Rent & Real Estate 1.5% 1.3% ?
Utilities .7% .9% ?
Depreciation .8% .7% ?
Trading Stamp Expense .9% .5% ?
Interest Expense .2% l .2Z ?
Operating Profit 2.1% 1.6% ?
Ratios
Sales per Man Hour $29.70 $53.50 ?
Weekly Sales per sq.ft. $ 3.22 $ 5.60 ?
(SellingArea)
Source: SMI Figure Exchange: 2nd Quarter 1975 Vs. 2nd Quarter 1965.
Trading stamp expense has decreased
substantially from .9% to .5% of sales.
If a supermarket has trading stamps,
their total expense is 2% of sales. If
they have no trading stamps, their
expense is zero. The composite figures
are what I have shown here. In other
words, in 1965 slightly less than half
the companies had trading stamps, which
resulted in a .9% of sales overall cost
to the industry. This compares to .5%
in 1975, which means that approximately
25% of the companies offer trading
stamps. This savings from the elimina-
tion of trading stamps has been a major
factor in covering the higher costs of
operations and maintaining the gross
margin levels without requiring further
increases. Interest expense has
remained approximately the same at .2%
of sales.
Finally, we look at operation
profit, which has decreased from 2.1%
to 1.6% of sales. This is about a
25% reduction in profit levels, and
remember that 1975 profits appeared
to be substantially better than the
last couple of years, which have been
a disaster for the food industry.
With the inflation that we are
all living with , approximately 40% of
the so-called profits in the industry
are necessary to pay the higher costs
of replacing equipment and maintain-
ing store inventories. So a substan-
tial portion of the profit is nec-
essary just for the industry to main-
tain itself in view of inflated costs
of equipment and inventory. Furtherm-
ore, a portion of the profit should
be available to the owners of the
business as a return on their invest-
ment. It is only in those industries
where the investms can get an adequate
return on their capital that will attract
the capital necessary to grow or, for
that matter, maintain itself.
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per square foot have increased sub-
stantially from 1965. However, when
these figures are adjusted for infla-
tion, there has been a very little
increase, if any, in these productivity
factors during this period.
In summary, I think that food
distributors must evaluate the return
on their investment in this industry.
They must look at the high risk assoc-
iated with investing capital in the
super stores and supermarkets of
tomorrow. In many cases that capital
may not be available to them at a cost
which is economically justified.
I think it is helpful to look at
the economics on a square foot basis
because it is the cost of space, the
cost of equipping the store, the cost
of providing the inventory and the
working capital which play such an
important part in the overall economics
of this business.
Finally, food distributors must
also look at their means of financing
their capital needs and determining
how they can properly manage their
debt as well as their assets.
Looking towards 1985 we can ask
ourselves what changes will take place.
Undoubtedly, there will be substantial
changes. However, in the food distri-
bution industry I think that these
changes will be rather slow in coming--
not necessarily from a technological
standpoint, but from a capital avail-
ability standpoint. We are in a situa-
tion where we already have enough square
footage of space to handle our needs
now and for the next several years.
It will be increasingly difficult to
obtain the capital that is necessary
to make radical changes. The key
element in guaranteeing the future of
the food distribution industry is to
keep it productive and keep it profit-
able.
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